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Abstract
This Article challenges the validity of Judge Pescatore’s theory [that Member States of the
ECC are prevented by Community law from intervening in the marketplace by legislation].

COMPETITION BETWEEN NATIONAL
ECONOMIES AND COMPETITION
BETWEEN BUSINESSES-A
RESPONSE TO JUDGE PESCATORE
Giuliano Marenco*
Are Member States of the EEC prevented by Community
law from intervening in the marketplace by legislation? The
theory set forth by Judge Pescatore in his article in the Fordham
InternationalLaw JournalI answers this question with a determined "yes." Indeed, this theory has never before been affirmed with such clarity, detail and authority.
If this theory were correct, then the European Community
would have become a centralized structure for economic purposes. It would already have gone further than the United
States, where the power to enact economic legislation is federally structured, in the sense that it is distributed between the
national government and the states. 2 This Article challenges
the validity of Judge Pescatore's theory.
* Legal Advisor, Commission of the European Communities. The views expressed in this Article are purely personal.
The author is indebted to Karen Banks, for her many valuable substantive and
linguistic suggestions, and Nobert Koch, for his comments on an earlier draft. He
also wishes to thank Claudine Girardi and Francine Van Assche for their patient and
fine secretarial help.
1. Pescatore, Public and Private Aspects of European Community Competition Law, 10
FORDHAM INT'L

L.J. 373 (1987).

2. The American reader will find a familiar echo in the discussion. The
problems debated here are indeed the same as those which in the United States go
under the heading of state action. The legal context is also, for all practical purposes, analogous. The Treaty of Rome is the Community constitution. Article 30 (of
the Treaty) is the equivalent in Community parlance of the dormant commerce
clause in the United States. The EEC competition rules, Articles 85 and 86 of the
Treaty, are roughly the European counterpart to sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act. The judicial principle that Community law takes precedence over the law of the
Member States corresponds to the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. A not fundamental difference is that the Community competition rules lie at the
constitutional level whereas their American counterparts have statutory rank. It is
hoped, given the similarity of the ground rules, that the American reader may take
more interest in the discussion than if this merely concerned an obscure point in the
law governing a foreign market.
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EEC COMPETITION-A RESPONSE
I. THE PROBLEM AND THE ARGUMENT
A. The Problem

Nearly thirty years after the enactment of the Treaty of
Rome, the individual Member States still consider themselves
primarily responsible for responding to social needs that arise
from time to time and therefore continue to legislate actively
in the economic area. Economic legislation inevitably distorts
competition. "Regulation displaces competition. Displacement is the purpose, indeed the definition, of regulation." '
The effects of virtually all economic legislation are comparable
to those of an agreement in restraint of trade. Indeed, the
backing of the government apparatus generally confers on regulatory schemes the capacity to produce stronger restrictive effects than those caused by a privately engineered cartel.
The facts in a recent case decided by the Court of Justice
and discussed by Judge Pescatore offer an eloquent example.
In Cullet,4 the French regulatory scheme at stake imposed a
minimum retail price for gasoline. The effect, and no doubt
the purpose, of the scheme was artificially to keep alive marginal gas stations which would have been driven out of the market had their competitors been able to lower prices freely.
Such legislation was aimed at distorting competition, not differently from-but much more effectively than-a price-fixing
cartel among all French gas stations.
A cartel of this kind would likely come under the prohibition of restrictive agreements set forth in Article 85 of the
Treaty of Rome. If there is any uncertainty as to the illegality
of such a cartel, it would bear on the prerequisite that the collusion affect interstate commerce. This prerequisite is as much
a condition for the applicability of the Community competition
rules as it is for that of the Sherman Act in the United States.5
If we assume that the cartel would indeed be prohibited by Article 85-which is most probable, for, as in the United States,
3. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26J.L. ECON. 23 (1983).
4. Judgment of 29 January 1985, Cullet v. Centre Leclerc Toulouse, Case
231/83, 1985 E.C.R. 305, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,139.
5. Compare Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, art. 85,
Mar. 25, 1957, 1973 Gr.Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I) (official English transl.), 298
U.N.T.S. 11 (1958) (unofficial transl.) [hereinafter EEC Treaty] with Sherman Act,
Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801, Pub. L. No. 93-145, 88 Stat. 1708, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2
(1982) (as amended Dec. 12, 1975).
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the interstate commerce requirement tends to be loosely construed-then the question arises whether state law may produce results which, if privately engineered, would run afoul of
Community competition rules.
The reason why an answer to this question does not
emerge simply from the principle of the supremacy of Community law over the law of Member States is precisely that Article
85 prohibits business conduct, not government regulation. A
prohibition of restrictive state regulation could only result
from some more complex reasoning than a mere application of
the supremacy principle.
On the other hand, if the answer were that state law may
not restrict competition, the Member States would have lost,
for all practical purposes, their legislative powers in the economic field. This would be an unexpected constitutional implication of the antitrust rules. Before accepting it, it would be
necessary to check whether the overall constitutional framework is not opposed to it.
To focus on the problem, it must be emphasized that the
legislative powers of the Member States in the economic field
are indeed restricted by the Treaty of Rome, in that they may
not be exercised in such a way as to protect domestic producers from out-of-state competition or to reserve scarce resources to domestic consumers. This restriction flows unquestionably from the detailed Treaty provisions on free movement
of goods and services, 6 which constitute the Community counterpart to the dormant commerce clause 7 and which undoubtedly go even further than the United States constitutional provision in the direction of establishing a common market. The
problem arises then only in relation to state regulation devoid
of any protectionist aspect. In other words, the problem is not
whether the Treaty of Rome is opposed to state regulation displacing competition between state economies: it certainly is.
The problem is whether the Treaty is opposed to state regulation displacing competition between domestic businesses or, at
any rate, between domestic and out-of-state businesses alike.
6. Article 30 is the prominent provision on free movement of goods. EEC
Treaty, supra note 5.
7. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. See generally Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison,
340 U.S. 349 (1951).
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As Judge Pescatore writes, "problems of competition and
hence the need for rules are found on two distinct levels: on
the level of private economic operators and on the level of national economies." 8 Our problem arises at the former level,
not the latter.
To limit further the scope of the debate, it should be added that the issue discussed here is whether anticompetitive
state regulation is compatible with the Treaty of Rome. When a
Member State behaves not in a regulatory capacity, but in a
business capacity, by supplying goods or services, whether
through a nationalized enterprise or even directly, it is generally agreed that its business conduct should comply with the
Community competition rules. The best example is probably
offered by the British Telecom case 9 in which the British Post Office, later British Telecom, was found to have abused its dominant position (a violation of Article 86) by engaging in certain
conduct while holding a legal monopoly. In this respect, Community law appears to accept a more extensive application of
the antitrust provisions than does the United States. In the
United States, the distinction between proprietary and regulatory activities of a governmental authority has been neglected
ever since City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. 10
B. Judge Pescatore's Theory
Judge Pescatore acknowledges that Articles 85 and 86 deal
with business conduct, whereas the Treaty provisions aimed at
ensuring the free movement of goods and services are addressed to the Member States." He believes, however, that an
overall interpretation of the Treaty would lead to the conclusion that the antitrust provisions should also apply to States (in
their regulatory capacity) while enterprises must comply
equally with the rules on free movement.' 2 Expressed in
8. Pescatore, supra note 1, at 374.
9. Judgment of 20 March 1985, Italian Republic v. Commission, Case 41/83,
1985 E.C.R. -, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,168 (United Kingdom as intervenor in
support of Commission).
10. 435 U.S. 389, 418 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring). In that case, ChiefJustice Burger advanced the distinction to no avail. In Town of Hallie v. City of Eau
Claire, - U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 1713 (1985), in which the activity was entrepreneurial,
no Justice even addressed the problem.
11. Pescatore, supra note 1,at 378.
12. Id. at 379-80.
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American terms, this theory would be tantamount to saying
that states violate the Sherman Act when they issue anticompetitive regulations, i.e. whenever they legislate in the economic
field, while businesses, like states, should be made to comply
with the dormant commerce clause.
The argument advanced to arrive at this conclusion is that
the Treaty would otherwise contain a lacuna (Judge Pescatore
speaks of "asymmetries") and that the defective draftingwhereby the competition rules apparently apply only to businesses and the free circulation provisions only to States-can
and must be remedied by resorting to the preamble to the
Treaty and to Article 3.1' The passage of the preamble on
which Judge Pescatore relies recognizes that the removal of
obstacles requires "concerted action in order to guarantee
steady expansion, balanced trade and fair competition."' 4 As
to Article 3, Judge Pescatore cites subsections a) and f), which
include the elimination of custom duties and quantitative restrictions on the import and export of goods between Member
States, as well as the institution of a system ensuring that competition in the Common Market is not distorted.' 5 In Judge
Pescatore's view, these two provisions enact a general rule of
fair competition, which constitutes a trunk, from which two
groups of branches develop.' 6
This Article shows that the asymmetries denounced by
Judge Pescatore are deliberate and justified and that his gapclosing effort to apply antitrust and free movement provisions
indiscriminately to both states and enterprises is therefore
neither necessary nor warranted.
II. THE FREE MOVEMENT PROVISIONS
Even as he observes that the rules on free movement are
13. Id. at 380.
14. EEC Treaty, supra note 5, preamble.
15. Id. art. 3.
16. Pescatore, supra note 1, at 378-79.
The trunk then splits into two groups of branches: the substantial branch of
rules applicable to undertakings, on the one hand, and a rather tangled
growth of individual provisions relating more particularly to the activity of
Member States, on the other. In my opinion, it is possible, by appropriate
legal husbandry, to introduce more harmony into this tree that has a solid
basis but unfolds in a somewhat disorderly fashion.
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primarily addressed to Member States, Judge Pescatore states
that they must be respected also by private operators.' 7 This is
a puzzling view, for the purpose of the rules on free movement
of goods and services-like the purpose of the dormant commerce clause-is to prohibit protectionist measures on the part
of state authorities. These authorities may be prompted to enact protectionist measures on the basis of their perception of
the public interest (in other words for political or electoral reasons), and they will be able to carry the project through by
using their coercive powers.
In contrast, a private operator will normally lack the motivation to prefer domestic goods or services, since he is supposed to be motivated by a desire for profit. He will also lack
the necessary coercive powers to discriminate, unless he colludes with other businesses or takes advantage of a dominant
market position, in which case, however, he will come under
the prohibitions of Articles 85 and 86, respectively.
Thus, it is hard to see why the rules on free movement
should apply to private operators. Moreover, even if they did,
they could only stand in the way of sound business judgment
and therefore obstruct the best allocation of resources.
Judge Pescatore takes the view that the jurisprudence of
the Court of Justice already applies the rules on free movement to private operators-most notably in the field of intellectual property rights.' 8 In certain specified circumstances,
Judge Pescatore points out, the Court of Justice has ruled that
in exercising his right, an intellectual property right holder
runs counter to the free movement rules.' 9 To be sure, the
reference to the exercise of a private operator's right seems to
warrant the view that the rules on free movement apply to
businesses. However, this is only appearance, facilitated by the
fact that intellectual property legislation generally delegates its
own implementation to those upon whom a right is conferred.
In fact, the state legislation itself is contrary to the rules on free
movement, to the extent that the legislation would allow a
right holder to enforce his right in the circumstances singled
17. Id. at 380.
18. Id. at 380-82. The American reader should remind himself at this point that,
in contrast to United States law, intellectual property legislation in Europe is primarily state, and not Community, legislation.
19. Id.
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out by the Court. This is generally recognized by the commentators 20 and clearly emerges also from the Court's language in
Musik-Vertrieb v. GEMA. 2 1 Judge Pescatore himself concludes
the argument with a sentence contradicting his own purported
demonstration, aimed at showing that the Court has applied
the rules on free movement to private operators in its cases on
intellectual property. He writes about the Merck judgment:
"This is an adequate solution as the obstacle to trade in these
cases results exclusively from the territorialcharacterof the laws defining and protecting industrial and commercial property
rights." 2 2 It would be impossible to point out more clearly
that what runs afoul of the rules on free movement is a feature
of the state legislation, not of private conduct.
The passage in the Dansk Supermarkedjudgment, 2 3 quoted
by Judge Pescatore, 24 is likewise insufficient to allow the conclusion that the rules on free movement also apply to businesses. To be sure, taken literally, that passage supports Judge
Pescatore's view. It must not be overlooked, however, that the
Court was considering whether the Danish fair competition law
20. See Koch, Article 30 and the Exercise of Industrial Property Rights to Block Imports,
1986 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 609 (1987).
21. Musik-Vertrieb Membran GmbH & K-tel Int'l v. GEMA--Gesellschaft fur
musikalische Auflihrungs- und mechanische Vervielfiltigungsrechte, Joined Cases
55 & 57/80, 1981 E.C.R. 147, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8670.
Articles 30 and 36 of the Treaty must be interpreted as precluding the application of national legislation under which a copyright management society
empowered to exercise the copyrights of composers of musical work reproduced on gramophone records or other sound recordings in another Member State is permitted to invoke those rights where those sound recordings
are distributed on the national market after having been put into circulation
in that other Member State by or with the consent of the owners of those
copyrights, in order to claim payment of a fee equal to the royalties ordinarily paid for marketing on the national market less the lower royalties paid in
the Member State of manufacture.
Id. at 166, para. 27, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8670, at 7925; see also Judgment of 9
July 1985, Pharmon v. Hoechst, Case 19/84, 1985 E.C.R. -, Comm. Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) -, in which the Court ruled that Articles 30 and 36 of the EEC Treaty do
not preclude the application of legal provisions of a Member State which give a patent proprietor the right to prevent the marketing in that State of a product which has
been manufactured in another Member State by the holder of a compulsory licence
granted in respect of a parallel patent held by the same proprietor. Id. at - (para. 5
of the judgment).
22. Pescatore, supra note 1, at 382 (emphasis added).
23. Dansk Supermarked A/S v. A/S Imerco, Case 58/80, 1981 E.C.R. 181, 195,
para. 17, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8729.
24. Pescatore, supra note 1, at 382.
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was contrary to the rules on free movement. In that context,
the Court had intended merely to exclude any possibility that
the notion of fair competition inscribed in the Danish law was a
matter that private parties could settle by contract. If the
Court had not ruled out that possibility, private parties could,
by agreement, have triggered the application of the fair competition law. Thus, the passage quoted by Judge Pescatore is
immediately followed by this one: "It follows that an agreement involving a prohibition on the importation into a Member State of goods lawfully marketed in another Member State
may not be relied upon or taken into consideration in order to
classify the marketing of such goods as an improper or unfair
commercial practice." 25
The reference by Judge Pescatore to the "open market"
concept in Pigs Marketing Board 26 is no more convincing. The
Court stated that the pigmeat market, like other Common Market organizations, "is based on the concept of an open market
to which every producer has free access and the functioning of
which is regulated solely by the instruments provided for by
that organization." Thus, national practices "alter[ing] the
pattern of imports or exports or influenc[ing] the formation of
market prices by preventing producers from buying and selling
freely within the State in which they are established, or in any
other Member State... are incompatible with the principles of
such organization of the market." '27 To begin with, the Com-

munity provisions in question were those setting up a common
organization for agricultural products, not those on free movement. What is more important is that the Court states clearly
that these provisions prohibit government action, not business
conduct. Producers are mentioned as the beneficiaries of the
prohibition, not as addressees.
Finally, it is submitted that the San Michele Order of the
Court 28 is inapposite to this issue. An Italian steel company
25. Dansk Supermarked, 1981 E.C.R. at 195, para. 17, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8729.
26. Pigs Mktg. Bd. v. Redmond, Case 83/78, 1978 E.C.R. 2347, 2371, para. 57,
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8559. For a discussion of this, see Pescatore, supra note 1,
at 377-78 n.10.
27. Pigs Mktg. Bd., 1978 E.C.R. at 2371 (para. 58 of the judgment), Comm. Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8559, at 8118.
28. Order of 22 June 1965, Acciaierie San Michele SpA v. High Authority of the
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had asked the Court for the interim suspension of a decision
addressed to it by the High Authority until the Italian Corte
Costituzionale had ruled on the constitutionality of the Coal
and Steel Treaty. The Court of Justice dismissed the application as "contrary to Community policy" inasmuch as its admission would establish a discrimination in favor of Italian nationals. 29
It may be concluded on this point that the Court of Justice
has correctly refrained from applying the rules on free movement to private operators. Not only are these rules expressly
concerned solely with government measures, but also their extension to private conduct would at best make no sense, and at
worst obstruct the allocation of resources between Member
States.
The rules on free movement constitute the central core
and the primary purpose of the Treaty of Rome, the main objective of which is to abolish state protectionist measures obstructing the international allocation of resources. These
rules, immediately applicable today without any implementing
measures, prevent Member States from exercising their powers in a protectionist manner. Member States remain free to
regulate their economies, however, provided that this is done
without protectionist effects. A confirmation of the fact that
the Treaty is not intended to deprive Member States of their
economic regulatory powers is afforded by Articles 100 to 102,
which assume the continued existence of state regulations that
may adversely affect the functioning of the Common Market or
distort the conditions of competition in this market. Article
100, in particular, provides that state legislation that affects the
functioning of the Common Market may be harmonized
through a statutory procedure at the Community level. This
provision thus performs a function comparable to the commerce clause of the United States Constitution. A legislative
power at the Community level is established, but this does not
exclude-indeed it implies and confirms-the continued existence of regulatory power at the state level.
The American reader will find this situation familiar and
European Coal & Steel Community, Case 9/65, 1967 E.C.R. 27 (cited by Pescatore,
supra note 1, at 377-78 n.13).
29. Id. at 30.
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obvious. Although the exercise of the powers conferred on
Congress by the commerce clause limits the states' maneuverability, the states retain the power to legislate in the areas not
displaced by federal law, provided they do not exceed the limits imposed by the dormant commerce clause. After 200 years,
the United States remains a federation in the economic area.
This situation is generally credited with a number of advantages: social needs can be taken care of by a government
closer to the people; states perform as social laboratories; and
the federal government is not encumbered by the necessity of
providing a solution for local problems.
It should come as no surprise that the drafters of the
Treaty of Rome made a similar choice. While it is true that
they restricted the powers of the Member States through the
rules on free movement, they had not intended to abolish
those powers altogether. The American experience shows that
it was not necessarily a second best solution. A distribution of
powers at different levels, as in a federal system of government, may be deemed preferable to a concentration of powers
at the highest level.
III. THE RULES ON COMPETITION
To the central core represented by the rules on free movement addressed to Member States, the drafters of the Treaty
added the competition rules addressed to enterprises. One
must agree with Judge Pescatore that there is a link between
these two sets of rules. This link probably will not appear evident to the American reader, to whom the idea that the Sherman Act should contribute to interstate market integration
would sound very strange indeed.
Antitrust was a foreign experience to the six states of continental Europe that adopted the competition rules, first in the
1951 Treaty establishing the Coal and Steel Community, and
then in the 1957 Treaty establishing the Economic Community. The main reason behind the Community antitrust rules
appeared to be the concern that the obstacles to interstate
trade, banned by the Treaties, might be resurrected in the
form of horizontal cartels set up by enterprises of the various
Member States which would divide markets among themselves
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along state lines. 30 Such a phenomenon would have frustrated
the international allocation of resources which it was intended
to promote. The Rapport de la D6legation Fran~aise, for example, emphasized that the elimination of quantitative restrictions and tariff barriers would have served no purpose if territorial allocation by manufacturers were permitted to replace
market division with governmental action.3 1 The Spaak Report
stated: "Des rbgles de concurrence qui s'imposent aux entreprises sont donc necessaires pour eviter que des doubles
prix aient le mme effet que des droits de douane, qu'un
dumping mette en danger des productions conomiquement
saines, que la repartition des marches se substitue 'a leur
cloisonnement. ' '3 2 It went on to say that the Treaty must provide the means necessary to prevent monopoly power and conduct from jeopardizing the fundamental objectives of the Common Market. In particular, it should prevent market division
brought about through the concerted action of private companies. 3
The drafters of the Treaty were not blind, however, to the
more general objective of the antitrust rules of helping to
achieve allocative and productive efficiency. Thus, according
to the Rapport de la D6l6gation Fran~aise:
En outre, 1'6tablissement du march6 commun ne concourt
pleinement au d~veloppement des productions les plus
6conomiques, tant de charbon que d'acier, dans les industries utilisatrices, que si cette concurrence joue librement
en fonction des avantages 6conomiques et de la productivit6: il est donc n~cessaire d'exclure les 61ments de domination aussi bien que de discrimination
l'interieur du
march6 commun.34
Judge Pescatore himself recognizes that "[t]he scope of
the competition rules is in some respects much larger than the
30. This can be gathered from the Rapport de la Dile'gation Fran~aisesur le Traiti
instituant la Communauti Europenne du Charbon et de lAcier (Minist~re des Affaires
Etrangres, Paris, 1951), a report drafted a posteriori by the French negotiators of
the Coal and Steel Treaty, its principle inspirational force, and from the Spaak Report,
Rapport des Chefs de Dilegation aux Ministres des Affaires Etrangires (Bruxelles, 1956),
which constituted the basis of the EEC Treaty.
31. Rapport de la Deligation Fran~aise,supra note 30, at 91.
32. Spaak Report, supra note 30, at 16.
33. Id. at 55.
34. Rapport de la Diligation Fran~aise,supra note 30, at 91.
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scope of the rules on free trade [because]," as he points out,
"the rules on free movement are concerned only with the free
exchange of goods and services, whereas the competition rules
pursue much more complex objectives such as optimal allocation of economic resources; economic progress; equitable
sharing of economic benefits between producers, distributors
' 35
and consumers; and defense against unfair trade practice.
Articles 85 and 86 contain no reference to a market integration
purpose,36 so that there is no obstacle to using these rules for
more general objectives. The market integration purpose has
nevertheless played a particularly important role in the actual
implementation of the competition rules-probably even an
excessive one, because many restrictive agreements tailored
along state lines and brought to the attention of the Community institutions were not the horizontal cartels feared by the
drafters of the Treaty, but less dangerous vertical arrangements (usually providing for territorial exclusivity at the distribution level). Yet, the fact that state lines were involved
caused these vertical arrangements to be regarded as serious
offenses to the very objectives of the Treaty and so triggered a
particularly (and arguably, excessively) harsh treatment.
The point that needs to be emphasized here, however, is
that competition rules pursue objectives which go far beyond

the market-integration purpose. For instance, if a horizontal
cartel between producers of the whole Community fixed uniform prices for the Common Market, no barrier to interstate
trade would ensue, yet such a cartel would be a classic case for
the application of Article 85. Similarly, vertical arrangements
demonstrate the difference between the evil fought by the
rules on free movement and the evil at the origin of the competition rules. Such arrangements also run afoul of Article 85.
35. Pescatore, supra note 1, at 385.
36. The requirement that interstate commerce be affected in order to trigger the
application of the EEC competition rules (not those of the Coal and Steel Treaty,
because for these two concentrated industries, the Community rules were designed
to be exclusive of state rules) is of course not a reference to a market integration
objective, as will be obvious to an American lawyer. Community lawyers sometimes
mistakenly view the interstate commerce condition as the object of the prohibition,
instead of as a limit on its application designed to take minor restrictions or abuses
out of the scope of Community rules. See Criminal Proceedings against Jan van de
Haar & Kaveka de Meern BV, Joined Cases 177 & 178/82, 1984 E.C.R. 1797, Comm.
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,094.
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Yet, an exclusive distribution agreement between producer in
Member State A and distributor in Member State B, far from
hampering imports from A to B, is intended to promote such
imports. If the Treaty outlaws this arrangement, the reason is
that it tends to channel imports through a given firm to the
exclusion of other firms belonging to the same Member State.
Thus, the competition rules protect competition between
individual businesses, not (or at least only incidentally) between national economies. While the rules on free movement
may exercise a legitimate role in the interpretation of the competition rules (businesses should not be able to achieve by private conduct results that are forbidden to Member States by
the rules on free movement), the reverse (that Member States
should not be able to achieve results forbidden to businesses
by the competition rules) is not true. As the court in Kaveka
stated: "Article 30 of the Treaty, which seeks to eliminate national measures capable of hindering trade between Member
States, pursues an aim different from that of Article 85, which
seeks to maintain effective competition between undertakings." ' 7
IV. THE ALLEGED "COMMON TRUNK"
The foregoing sections are intended to show that the two
sets of rules (on free movement and on competition) have only
partially overlapping objectives and cannot have the same addressees: their "asymmetries" are deliberate and justified.
To bring the two sets of rules to a unity of purpose and
scope, Judge Pescatore tries to find them a "common trunk."
However, the fourth recital of the preamble 3 8 is a vague
formula, which can no doubt be taken as testimony to the link
perceived by the authors of the Treaty between the free movement and competition rules. It neither denies the broader
scope of the latter, nor postulates that both sets of rules must
have the same addressees. Article 3 is an anticipation of the
main chapters of the Treaty, so when it mentions the "institu37. Van de Haar & Kaveka, 1984 E.C.R. at 1813, para. 14, Comm. Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,094.
38. EEC Treaty, supra note 5, preamble, 4th recital ("[r]ecognising that the removal of existing obstacles calls for concerted action in order to guarantee steady
expansion, balanced trade and fair competition").
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tion of a system ensuring that competition in the common market is not distorted,

'3 9

it says nothing about the content of the

said regime. Such content can only emerge from a reading of
the specific provisions of the Treaty. In his Article, Judge Pescatore makes a thorough inventory of these provisions and arrives at the conclusion that while, as to rules applying to enterprises, Articles 85 and 86 "constitute the foundations of an almost complete system of competition rules, the provisions
applicable to Member States appear to be not only incoherent,
but also to some extent severed from the rules applicable to
private operators." 40 But if this is the picture that emerges
from the specific provisions of the Treaty, it is hardly possible
that anything more can be gained from Article 3(f) itself.
In fact, the competition rules applicable to Member States
are limited to Article 90(1) (on the relations between Member
States and public enterprises) and to Articles 92-94 (on state
subsidies). And when one looks at Articles 37 and 90(1), it is
plain that both provisions assume the legality in principle of
Member States granting legal monopolies. This reveals a distinct pattern, which is that a Member State, unless otherwise
provided (as in relation to state subsidies), may restrict competition among enterprises. It may regulate the economic context in which they compete or set limits to their competitive
behavior.
Contrary to Judge Pescatore's view, this pattern, far from
revealing any inconsistency with other Treaty provisions, is
consistent with the kind of structure the framers of the Treaty
intended. This structure is federal in character, which means
that, provided competition is not restricted between national
economies, each Member State is allowed to continue to regulate, or not to regulate, its economy according to the political
drives prevailing at the time. This was not only a wise choice,
but, given the variety of political climates and traditions of government in the different Member States, was also the only possible one. It is simply unimaginable that, by establishing the
Community in 1957, the Member States renounced all independent economic regulation. By not outlawing anticompetitive state regulation, the Treaty allows the use of interven39. EEC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 3().
40. Pescatore, supra note 1, at 378.
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tionist measures which may become necessary even in a freeenterprise economy and manifests its neutrality in the political
debate going on within the Member States between laissezfaire and government intervention.
V. ARTICLE 5 OF THE TREATY
Article 5 imposes on Member States an obligation to "abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment
of the objectives of this Treaty."' 4 1 Because many preliminary
references by state judges to the Court of Justice, and as a result many judgments of the Court, address the legality of state
regulations in light of the combination of Article 5 and the
competition rules (in most cases Article 85), one must ask
whether this cocktail is so explosive as to reverse the reasoning
developed above by rendering state regulation unlawful.
Clearly, Article 5 stresses a broad obligation of loyalty to
the Community on the part of Member States, but does not
inject any new substance into the obligations of the Member
States. The substantive obligations of the Member States must
be found elsewhere in the Treaty, and the foregoing analysis
shows that none of the substantive provisions of the Treaty
prevent Member States from restricting competition. If the
Treaty does not pursue the objective of depriving the Member
States of their power to regulate in the economic field, but only
of trimming this power of all protectionist features, then the
reference to the objectives of the Treaty in Article 5 could not
be understood as actually furnishing such objective.
Article 5 can only contribute to a far more modest result.
Because Articles 85 and 86 outlaw certain specified business
conduct, Member States may not, in the process of regulating
the economy, make room for this prohibited conduct. They
may not send to businesses signals which are contrary to the
Community prohibitions. Thus, they may not impose, legitimize, or encourage business behavior banned by Community
law, such as restrictive agreements. This is probably not a very
severe limitation on state powers and could be attained even in
the absence of Article 5. It is merely a case of preemption of
41. EEC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 5.
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state powers in the face of superior law, in this case Articles 85
and 86.
It should be noted that the supremacy of Community law
over state law has a double effect in this case. Not only is the
state scheme that sanctions prohibited business conduct preempted and therefore unenforceable, but at the same time it is
incapable of legalizing the prohibited conduct in which it may
encourage some businesses to engage. Thus, if the state
scheme purports to compel some firms to enter into anticompetitive agreements, the firms can successfully resist enforcement. However, if they do comply with the state imposition,
the agreements they have entered into will be null and void. In
the latter case, the firms will also, in principle, be liable for
damages and fines. The most that could be argued in their
favor is that, in relation to fines, the state scheme would represent a mitigating factor.
VI. THE RECENT CASE LAW OF THE COURT OFJUSTICE
Judge Pescatore's theory prompts him to criticize the way
the Court of Justice and the Commission have recently dealt
with four cases involving state schemes providing for anticompetitive prices to the detriment of consumers. 4 2 Judge Pescatore appears to think that in all cases the state scheme should
have been struck down. He summarizes his criticism in the following terms: "The questions raised by the referring French
courts, as we have seen, related exclusively to competition law.
The Court decided two cases on the basis of competition law
and two others on the basis of Article 30, without revealing any
consistent doctrine. ' '4 3 It is necessary at this point to re-examine these cases in light of the arguments developed above.
In the Clair case, 44 cognac prices were fixed by representatives of producers and distributors in the framework of an inter-trade organization set up by law. The law provided that
such agreements could be made binding by ministerial decree
on all traders concerned. The question put to the Court was
42. Pescatore, supra note 1, at 416.
43. Id.
44. Judgment of 30 January 1985, Bureau National Interprofessionel du Cognac
(B.N.I.C.) v. Clair, Case 123/83, 1985 E.C.R. 391, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,160.
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whether the agreement (not the statute or decree) was contrary to
Article 85. In holding Article 85 applicable, the Court rejected
all arguments that the agreement was legal because it had been
struck under the auspices of governmental action.4 5 Judge
Pescatore does not advance any specific criticism of this judgment. Nor does any criticism follow from this Article. Business conduct was challenged in Clair. It follows from the
supremacy of Community law that business conduct contrary
to Community competition rules may not be legitimized by
state action.4 6
While no question was raised in Clair as to the legality of
state enactments, such a question was put to the Court in Asjes,
the air tariffs case.4 7 The state scheme, the legality of which
was in question, was, for all practical purposes, identical with
those underlying the facts considered by the United States
Supreme Court in Southern Motor Carriers:48 it provided for
state approval of rates jointly proposed by transport companies.
The Court of Justice held that Member States would violate the Treaty if they required or favored the adoption of
agreements, decisions or concerted practices contrary to Article 85 or reinforced their effects. However, for technical reasons linked to the particular industry concerned (air transport), which do not need to be expounded here, the Court did
not decide whether in the instant case the joint proposal of air
tariffs to a government body was to be characterized as prohibited conduct, leaving this issue to the Commission. Judge Pescatore's criticism seems to bear only on this last point, for-in
his view-the Court should itself have characterized the conduct in question as illegal. Although this criticism is questionable, and the issue of the illegality of that conduct presents
45. Id. at -, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,160, at 15,954.
46. Cf Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). "[A] state does not give immunity
to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declar-

ing that their action is lawful .... Id. at 351. This ruling has been weakened by
subsequent decisions. See, e.g., Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v.
United States, - U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 1721 (1985); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579
(1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
47. Judgment of 30 April 1986, Minist~re Public v. Asjes (Nouvelles Frontires),
Joined Cases 209-213/84, 1986 E.C.R. -, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,287.
48. 471 U.S. 48 (1985).
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more problems than Judge Pescatore is ready to accept, his
criticism is extraneous to the problems discussed here and
therefore does not need to be explored further in this response. In contrast, what should be stressed is the reason for a
possible illegality of state enactments advanced by the Court:
such enactments may neither require norfavor business conduct
contrary to Article 85, nor reinforce their effects. As already observed, this illegality derives from the principle of supremacy,
or possibly from Article 5. On this point, Judge Pescatore also
appears to find the judgment quite convincing. It may be
added that strikingly similar language can be found in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
In Rice v. Williams,4 9 for example, the Supreme Court
noted that federal antitrust law does not preempt a state statute if the statute "might have an anticompetitive effect." 50
Further, the Court noted that a state statute may be struck
down under the antitrust laws "only if it mandates or authorizes conduct that necessarily constitutes a violation of the antitrust laws in all cases, or if it places irresistible pressure on a
private party to violate the antitrust laws in order to comply
with the statute."'" These passages were recently quoted with
approval and followed in Fisher v. City of Berkeley,5 2 the most
recent Supreme Court decision on this subject.
Under the logic followed by both Courts-which, for the
reasons already advanced, appears to be the only logic warranted-the treatment by the Court in Cullet5" of a state
scheme providing directly for minimum retail prices for gasoline, is straightforward and readily comprehensible. The
Court noted that the scheme was not intended "to compel suppliers and retailers to conclude agreements or to take any
other action of the kind referred to in Article 85(1) of the
Treaty. On the contrary, [it] entrust[s] responsibility for fixing
prices to the public authorities ....

"54

Because the rules con-

cerned were "state rules," not business arrangements, the
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
231/83,
54.

458 U.S. 654 (1982).
Id. at 659.
Id. at 661.
- U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 1045 (1986).
See Judgment of 29 January 1985, Cullet v. Centre Leclerc Toulouse, Case
1985 E.C.R. 305, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,139.
Id. at -, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,139, at 15,746.
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Court concluded that they were "not capable of depriving the
rules on competition applicable to undertakings of their effectiveness."' 55 The Court then considered the scheme under the
rules on free movement and found that the mechanism used to
fix prices was such as to put domestic production in a more
favorable position with respect to imports from other Member
States. To that extent it held the scheme unlawful.
Judge Pescatore criticizes the fact that the Court resorted
to the rules on free movement. He notes that, in so doing, the
Court repeatedly referred to competition between domestic
and imported products, apparently implying that this very reference to competition should have led the Court to strike
down the scheme under the competition rules rather than
under the rules on free movement. 5 6 This criticism is not justified for the same reason stated above by Judge Pescatore himself. Because the concept can hardly be better expressed, his
words are quoted again here: "problems of competition and
hence the need for rules are found on two distinct levels: on
the level of private economic operators and on the level of national economies. ' 57 The problem of competition which the
Court had to face and which it solved correctly in Cullet lies at
the level of national economies.
Judge Pescatore's strongest criticism is reserved for the
Leclercjudgment concerning book prices. 5s That judgment will
not be defended here, but the criticism advanced will be diametrically opposed to Judge Pescatore's. The state statute in
Leclerc had the same purpose as that in Cullet: it was aimed at
protecting marginal firms (in this case, small bookstores) from
the competition of chain stores. However, books are not as
fungible a product as gasoline. Thus, the state did not assume
the task of fixing a retail price for each book. Rather, the law
required each publisher to fix such prices for the books he
published. Retailers were limited to undercutting that price by
a maximum of 5 percent. Was the statute contrary to Articles 5
and 85?
The Court replied in the negative and, unlike Judge Pes55. Id.
56. Pescatore, supra note 1, at 412-14.
57. Id. at 374.
58. Judgment of 10 January 1985, Leclerc v. Au B16 Vert, Case 229/83, 1985
E.C.R-, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,111.
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catore, I do not quarrel with this result. However, it reached
this conclusion via a tortured reasoning process, which is extremely difficult to summarize and also too long to quote. The
quotation must be confined to the following key passage,
which represents the high point of the judgment's inconsistencies:
Legislation of the type at issue does not require agreements
to be concluded between publishers and retailers or other
behaviour of the sort contemplated by Article 85(1) of the
Treaty; it imposes on publishers and importers a statutory
obligation to fix retail prices unilaterally. Accordingly, the
question arises as to whether national legislation which renders corporate behaviour of the type prohibited by Article
85(1) superfluous, by making the book publisher or importer responsible for freely fixing binding retail prices, detracts from the effectiveness of Article 85 and is therefore
contrary to the second paragraph of Article 5 of the
Treaty. 59
In the first sentence, the Court follows the same line of reasoning as Cullet and Asjes (which, it must be stressed, were decided
after this case): the statute did not sanction prohibited business conduct. Under this logic, the Court could have stopped
there by upholding the statute with regard to the competition
rules.
The second sentence modifies the whole picture, however,
and it is ironic that it should begin with the word "accordingly": what is the logical relation between that word and the
previous statement? According to the Court, the question
arises whether legislation which renders prohibited corporate
behavior superfluous is contrary to Articles 5 and 85. The
trouble is that it is possible to say of every coercive regulation
that, because it has effects comparable to those of a restrictive
agreement, it renders such an agreement superfluous. Did
not, for instance, the gasoline price scheme render a cartel between gas stations superfluous?
If it were accepted that such a "rendering superfluous"
was illegal, Member States could no longer enact anticompetitive legislation and would therefore no longer be able to regulate their economies. I have already tried to show that the
59. Id. at -,

Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)

14,111, at 15,435.
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Treaty not only affords no leverage point for such a theory, but
that on the contrary it offers the clearest indications to the contrary: the legality of state monopolies is explicitly assumed by
Articles 37 and 90(1). The core of the Treaty consists of provisions aimed merely at trimming the regulatory powers of the
Member States of their protectionist features; and express
rules are laid down (Articles 100 to 102) to deal with cases in
which a difference in state regulations could produce distortions of competition.
Judge Pescatore believes that all this can be swept away on
the basis of the preamble and of Article 3 of the Treaty. In this
we differ, and of course it is not a minor difference. But I
agree with him entirely on one point: under the "rendering
superfluous" approach, the Court ofJustice should have struck
down the statute: the reasoning whereby it has managed to
avoid this result is incomprehensible.6 0
With regard to the Leclerc case, Judge Pescatore criticizes
not only the Court, but also, (and very harshly) the Commission for the position taken before the Court as amicus curiae.
First, Judge Pescatore finds that the Commission "retreated far
from the position it had vigorously defended so recently in the
case of the Dutch language book market. "' 6 ' However, that
case 6 2 involved a classic cartel among businesses, so that the
two situations were not comparable.
Second, Judge Pescatore finds "surprising" the statement
by the Commission that a measure taken by a Member State
might "in principle validly produce effects comparable to those
of an agreement prohibited under Article 85. 163 Judge Pescatore's own article, however, shows that such surprise is unjustified. Does he not write that the competition provisions applicable to Member States appear to be "not only incoherent,
but also to some extent severed from the rules applicable to
that more harmony could only be inprivate operators, "164 and ta
60. Pescatore, supra note 1, at 411.
61. Id. at 410.
62. VBVB & VBBB v. Commission, Joined Cases 43 and 63/82, 1984 E.C.R. 19,
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,042.
63. Pescatore, supra note 1, at 410 (quoting Leclerc, Case 229/83, 1985 E.C.R. at
-,
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,111 at 15,430) (Pescatore's emphasis).
64. Id. at 378.
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troduced "by appropriate legal husbandry"? 65 After these acknowledgments, he can hardly be surprised that the Commission was not struck by the idea that the preamble and Article
3(f) of the Treaty would suffice to compel Member States to
give up their "legislative sovereignty in the field of economic
legislation.'

66

Third, Judge Pescatore characterizes as "a disconcerting
legal position" the submission made by the Commission that
state measures would only be contrary to Article 5 when they
(i) favored or facilitated conclusion of agreements between undertakings, or (ii) extended the effect of such agreements to
third parties, or (iii) permitted undertakings to escape the obligations of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty.67
It is hoped that the foregoing sections of this Article have
explained the logic of this theory, which one cannot accurately
summarize, as Judge Pescatore does, by saying that state measures interfering with the Community's competition rules
would only be prohibited in exceptional cases.68 In fact, according to the theory criticized by Judge Pescatore, the cases enumerated above are the only ones in which there would be interference with the competition rules, because it is only in these
cases that state measures appear to contradict the prohibition
addressed to businesses by those rules. Where does the interference with the competition rules lie, when a state measure
restricts competition without prompting or otherwise condoning illegal business behavior? In this respect, Judge Pescatore
writes: "[T]he effect of the French legislation was to impose
corporate behavior squarely opposed to Article 85(1), which
expressly prohibits fixing of retail prices, and to nullify the
powers reserved to the Commission under Article 85(3) as far
as the French book market was concerned. ' ' 69 This statement

is not easily understood. The effect of the French legislation
was to impose an obligation not to enter into a resale price
maintenance agreement, but to charge a price unilaterally
fixed by the publisher. Such an obligation could not render
ineffective the powers reserved to the Commission under Arti65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 379.
at 374.
at 411.
at 411-12.
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cle 85(3) precisely because these powers exist only with respect
to business agreements. Judge Pescatore should also acknowledge that if the Commission standpoint was a disconcerting
legal position, it is a position which, as pointed out above, is
shared by both the Court of Justice and the United States
Supreme Court.70
CONCLUSION
Judge Pescatore's theory purports to deprive Member
States of their regulatory powers in economic matters. This
theory carries with it two sets of values, one relating to the
need to accelerate the political integration of Western Europe,
the other involving a preference for laissez-faire over government economic interventionism (the first presumably being
Judge Pescatore's prime motivation).
It is not altogether impossible that if, by judicial fiat, the
Member States found themselves deprived overnight of their
economic regulatory powers, instead of reacting in a way that
could be dangerous for the Court of Justice and consequently
for the Community as a whole, they would agree to improve
the decisionmaking power of the Community, thus triggering a
giant step toward more political integration. Even on this idyllic hypothesis, however, the theory has a major disadvantage:
it would predetermine the choice about the distribution of
powers in the economic field. A Community monopoly of
these powers is not necessarily a better solution than a "federal" distribution of powers between the Community and the
Member States. The American model should a fortiori fit the
European environment, with its greater variety of economic
situations and relations between peoples and governments, entrenched in centuries-long traditions and in linguistic differences. A Community directly in charge of all economic
problems arising here and there without the screen of the state
70. The facts in Leclerc bear some resemblance to those in California Retail Liquor Dealers v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980), in which the United
States Supreme Court struck down the state statute at issue under the antitrust laws.
There was, however, a major difference in the American case: the California statute
required all wine producers and wholesalers to file fair trade contracts or price schedules with the state. Therefore, it provided for an obligation or at least for a strong
incitement to the businesses concerned to violate the federal antitrust statutes. In
contrast, in Leclerc, only unilateral conduct was required.
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governments would be a giant with clay feet, weakened rather
than strengthened by the minutiae of its responsibilities.
As to the choice in favor of laissez-faire, it is a respectable
one, but it remains to be seen whether all political forces in the
Member States are ready to embrace it, particularly in a rigidly
legal form. It remains above all to be seen whether this political position is warranted by the law. Judge Pescatore's legal
view moves from the postulate that the rules on free movement
must apply not only to Member States, but also to enterprises,
and that conversely the competition rules must apply not only
to enterprises, but also to Member States. It goes on by assuming that if the foregoing is not expressed in the Treaty, it is
due to defective drafting, and it suggests that harmony could
be introduced by resorting to the preamble and to Article 3.
As to his postulate, Judge Pescatore acknowledges that the
specific provisions of the Treaty do not support it. That this is
not due to any defect is proved by the alternative (and arguably
preferable) model of a federal economic Europe and by the
American example. Finally, as to the preamble and Article 3,
Judge Pescatore artificially forces them to express what plainly
they do not say.

